Exploring Moral Relativism

This article explores moral relativism through an article in the online philosophy magazine Philosophy Now written by Paul Stearns, a philosophy professor at Blinn College, Texas, entitled ‘Right and Wrong about Right and Wrong.’[1] Note that the moral relativism which Stearns is arguing against here is not the claim that there are no universal standards from which we can judge the behaviour of people in different times or cultures from our own, therefore all behaviours, norms, and practices are acceptable, or at least not open to criticism from people outside those times/cultures. Rather, he is responding to the diachronic relativist assertion that basic moral values change over time. In the first part, I will outline Stearns’ arguments against this moral relativist claim before evaluating them in the second part.

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Utilitarianism’s Repugnant Conclusion

I recently watched the discussion Alex O’Connor (CosmicSkeptic) had with Peter Singer earlier this year on YouTube (check it out for yourself here) in which the pair discuss animal rights and ethics in general. Incidentally, I was really impressed with Singer here. I’d never seen him in this type of… well, it wasn’t a debate, but it was a ‘debate-ish’, discussion before, and I think his experience and knowledge really shone through (by the way, I say this as someone who disagrees with him on a couple of key issues). Anyway, during the discussion, the notorious utilitarian problem known as the repugnant conclusion came up, prompting me to offer my own two cents.

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CosmicSkeptic on Objective Morality (2): Pleasure and Morality

This is the second of a two-part series in which I assess CosmicSkeptic’s (a.k.a. Alex O’Connor) claim that he can make morality objective. A crucial part of O’Connor’s argument is that human behaviour is completely determined, so my first article argued against O’Connor, that we are meaningfully free. This article will address O’Connor’s claim that ultimately the only thing we desire (and which we must desire) is pleasure, before critiquing the way he brings this all together into a theory of an objective morality.

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Nietzsche – On the Genealogy of Morals

Morality is concerned with right and wrong, good and bad. While there are a number of different moral systems and they all justify their values in different ways, few of them disagree on exactly what those core values are. Whether kindness is good because it maximises happiness or because it’s what a virtuous person would do or because we can will that it should become a universal law, no moral system worthy of the name ‘morality’ goes so far as to question the value of kindness itself. This is where Nietzsche comes in. In his On the Genealogy of Morals he does just this, calling our values into question by attempting to uncover exactly where they come from and, in the process, showing us that, far from tenets carved in stone we are beholden to, they are contingent rules we have ourselves devised. In this essay, I will outline and critically discuss a few of the key concepts from the book.

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The Ethics of Vegetarianism

Is killing animals for food morally indefensible? Many people think so, and not just vegetarians. Even many omnivores acknowledge their moral deficiency on this point. I recently listened to Sam Harris and a guest (on Harris’ Waking Up podcast) concede that anything other than vegetarianism is morally indefensible, while at the same time admitting they can’t, or won’t, stop eating meat. But is this the final word on this discussion?

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A Few Problems with Utilitarianism

In this article I am going to outline a few problems with utilitarianism that occurred to me after a discussion with a friend. Of course, there is a vast philosophical literature on this subject but I am going to restrict myself to a few comments that relate directly to what my utilitarian friend had to say on the topic.

I will define “utilitarianism” as the ethical principle that one ought to act so as to maximise happiness (or minimise the suffering) of sentient or ‘semi-sentient’ beings (i.e. including most animals).

Some of the arguments you will encounter might strike you as somewhat pedantic; calculating happiness, giving away half of your salary to those in greater need, etc., and it is a perfectly reasonable response to claim that utilitarianism is useful as a guide but ought not to be taken to a literal extreme. Indeed, that is a position I would also endorse. I have addressed this article to the moral agent who takes utilitarianism seriously and believes happiness/suffering really is the only, or at least, the best, way to assess moral problems. Note that this category also includes the person who claims to be using utilitarianism as a guide only but then turns around and advocates a suspicious ethical position purely based on utilitarian grounds, such as; claiming it is unethical to bring children into the world, or arguing that we ought to push one fat man in front of a trolley to save six others (why were they standing on the railway tracks in the first place?)[1].

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